International Law of Human Rights: A Pragmatic Appraisal by del Russo, A. Luini
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 9 | Issue 3 Article 8
International Law of Human Rights: A Pragmatic
Appraisal
A. Luini del Russo
Copyright c 1968 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
A. Luini del Russo, International Law of Human Rights: A Pragmatic Appraisal, 9 Wm. & Mary L. Rev.
749 (1968), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol9/iss3/8
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
A PRAGMATIC APPRAISAL
A. LuINI DEL Russo:"
The quest for Human Rights coincides with the quest for recognition
of the individual qua individual in international law.' It does not purport
to affect or be affected by nationality ties between man and the State
having jurisdiction over him, but rather it sets forth the principle that
recognition and protection of individual freedoms, while primarily
implemented at the national level, are a matter of international concern
as the foundation of the political stability of nations under law and thus
of the peace of the world.
This collective interest in the respect and preservation of Human
Rights can only be secured through the establishment of an effective
system of international control over State action in the area of funda-
mental freedoms. Thus, to be fully effective it requires a surrender by
sovereign States of the traditional concept of their exclusive sovereign
powers over individuals within their jurisdiction; it carves the issue of
human rights out of that domain of exclusive domestic jurisdiction.
There are two revolutionary concepts inherent in the international
law of Human Rights: the recognition of the individual as a subject
of relevance to international law regardless, or even in spite of, nation-
ality ties; and, as a natural corollary, the establishment by conventional
international law of a real system of control on States' compliance with
Human Rights obligations as to all persons within their juridiction,
aliens, stateless and nationals.
THE INDIviDuAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
Over two decades have passed since the first historic achievement in
the recognition of the individual as a subject of relevance to the law of
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1. LAUrERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAw a.ND HU mAN RIGHTS (1950); LADoR-LEDERER,
The Individual and His Access to international Jurisdiction, ISRAELi REPORTS TO THE
SIXTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW, at 113 (1962).
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nations. The Nuremberg trials demolished the traditional principle that
the "act of state" doctrine would clothe individuals committing war
crimes in pursuance of the authority of the State with the protection
of sovereign immunity.2 The pioneering activity of the International
Labor Organization greatly contributed to world society's growing
awareness of the fundamental rights of individuals.3
The Charter of the United Nations proclaimed the dignity of man
and pledged its members to the respect and observance of Human Rights
for all individuals everywhere without discrimination,4 and the adoption
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights set forth the dimensions
and relevance of the concept of fundamental freedoms referred to in the
Charter.- It defined the common standards to be used in the future, both
nationally and internationally. Although deprived of any binding force
when approved (as it is not conventional international law), the Declara-
tion nevertheless has exercised such wide and deep moral influence on
old and young nations alike that it has permeated the substantive law of
the world community, 6 and its principles have become accepted in the
practice of states as international customary law)
Even though the urgency of the issue had become relevant to the
nations of the world and the standards of the fundamental freedoms
of man had been defined, the individual found no improvement in his
position vis-1-vis the State as to the implementation of those standards.
This would remain true so long as there was no institutionalized protec-
tion of his rights at the international level and the member States did
2. Individual responsibility to mankind for war crimes was proclaimed in the language
of the Nuremberg Court: "individuals have international duties which transcend the
national obligations of obedience imposed by the individual state."
3. This was achieved not only through the Declaration of Philadelphia, but par-
ticularly in establishing a tripartite system of representation at international conferences
and a machinery of control over national compliance with international standards of
Human Rights in the field of labor relations, open to States and individuals. See
WEAVER, THE I.L.O. AND HUMAN RInrs (1967).
4. U.N. CHARTER preamble, arts. 55, 56.
5. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Standard of Achievement, UN
Doc. 62.1.9 at 13. See also Cassin, La ddclaration universelle et la rwise en oeuvre des
droits de l'hornme, II Recueil des cours 237 (1951) if; Sc-wvLB, HUMAN RIorrs AND
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 47 (1964).
6. Treaties have been concluded to implement specific provisions of the Declaration.
The constitutions of 17 emerging countries have incorporated basic rights proclaimed
for the first time in the Declaration.
7. See Waldock, Humian Rights in Contemporary International Law, in TM EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 15 (British Institute of International and Comparative
Law, Series 5, 1965).
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not assume a firm international obligation as to any of the rights defined
in the Declaration.
The two Human Rights Covenants approved by the General As-
sembly and opened for signature on December 16, 1966,8 bear the scars
of the ideological conflicts which create such formidable barriers to
success and progress in the field of Human Rights.' It is interesting to
compare the provisions of the Covenants with the original 1948 text
of the Covenant on Human Rights drafted by the Human Rights Com-
mission of the United Nations which included the Australian proposal 0
for an International Court of Human Rights open both to states and to
individuals for the adjudication of violations of fundamental freedoms.
The present Covenants, which will come into force three months after
ratification by 35 states, will not provide any international procedural
redress to individuals, either before a tribunal or before any adjudicating
body empowered to hear the case or pass on any allegation of Human
Rights violations. The effort to reach a compromise has whittled away
the effectiveness of the original proposal to a point of illusory consist-
ency. The issue of Human Rights has remained a purely political ques-
tion to be settled by sovereign States only; thus, it is still fraught with
emotional charges and deprived of the impassive atmosphere of legal
proceedings.
The preambles to both Covenants not only refer initially to the prin-
ciples proclaimed in the Charter and to the ideals laid down in the
Declaration, but close with a novel reference to the involvement of the
individual in the Human Rights struggle: "Realizing that the individual
having duties to other individuals and the community to which he be-
longs, is under a responsibility to strive for promotion and observance
of the rights recognized in the present Covenant. .... 1
The language would be of extraordinary importance in a theoretical
sense, as to the recognition of the relevance of the individual to inter-
national law, were it not for the fact that, in practice, according to the
provisions of the Covenants, he is still abandoned to his sole efforts in
the fulfillment of such new duty.
In the Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights the con-
tracting parties merely commit themselves "to take steps... with a view
8. U.N.G.A. REs. 2200 (XXI) (1966).
9. JENES, LAW, FREEDOM AND WELFARE, 14 (1963).
10. PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE, CONFER. Doc. (GEN.) I3. 13 at 444-45 (1946).
11. COVENANT ON ECON. Soc. & CuLT. RIGHTS; and COVENANT ON CiViL & POL. RIGHTS;
U.N.G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) (1966).
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to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized
in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including the adoption
of legislative measures." 12 Not only will this Covenant, when effective,
not be self-executing, but it will entail a mere initiation of progressive
steps leading in the future to the recognition and protection of the rights
defined in the Covenant."3 Developing countries are even held to a
lower degree of compliance, as they will be permitted to "determine
to what extent they would guarantee the economic rights ... to non-
nationals." 14 The only firm obligation of ratifying states will be to sub-
mit to the Economic and Social Council reports on progress achieved.
No remedy is provided for a breach of the Covenant.
The other Covenant, on Civil and Political Rights, does expressly com-
mit each member state "to respect and to ensure to all individuals within
its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the
present Covenant" 1 and to take steps to conform its legislation to the
implementation of the Covenant. This inclusion among "individuals" of
nationals, stateless and aliens truly recognizes the direct interest of inter-
national law in man qua man. However, after the detailed definition of
protected rights, the Covenant again limits institutional control to the
establishment of an elective eighteen-member Human Rights Committee
to which the States undertake to submit reports on the measures adopted
to implement the principles of the Covenant.'
Only two optional measures are contemplated to provide some much
needed control. Under Article 41, if at least ten States parties to the
Covenant declare that they recognize such competence, the Committee
may have the power to receive States' "communications" as to the breach
of obligations under the Covenant by another State party who has also
submitted such a declaration. But in that event, the Committee's func-
tion would be merely to receive both States' submissions, attempt a
friendly settlement at a meeting in camera and thereafter prepare a re-
port on the results reached. If no settlement is reached the Committee
may, with the consent of the States concerned, appoint an ad hoc Con-
ciliation Commission of five members to consider the matter, attempt
12. COVENANT ON ECON. Soc. & CULT. RIGHTS, art. 2(1).
13. See Statement by United Kingdom Delegate in the Third Committee, U.N. Doe.
A/C, 3/SR. 1396, at 11 (1966).
14. Supra note 12 at art. 2(3).
15. COVENANT ON CIVIL & POL., RIGHTS, art. 2 (1).
16. Id. at art. 40.
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a solution and report its findings to the Committee on questions of fact
relevant to the issues and its views on the possibility of a friendly solu-
tion. The individual has no access to any international body under this
provision.
The optional protocol appended to the second Covenant is the only
measure in both treaties which contemplates a direct recourse by the
individual to the Human Rights Committee, although any legal term
such as "petition" or "application" has been deleted and the neutral
word "communication" is used. 17 The Committee shall examine in cam-
era the communications. There is no provision for adjudication of the
dispute or for specific remedies. The end result of the Committee's
investigation will be limited to the forwarding of views to the State and
the individual concerned, and to the inclusion of the matter in the annual
report to the General Assembly on all of the activities and functions
entrusted to it.
The adoption of the two Covenants will be, nevertheless, an impor-
tant step toward transposing the issue of Human Rights into the realm of
legal concepts. It appears impossible to forecast how long the total
process will take as only fourteen States to date have signed the two
Covenants and no ratification has yet been deposited.
AN EFFECTIVE PATTERN OF INTERNATIONAL CONTROL
Having observed the long delayed performance and the minimal re-
sults achieved by the world organization in the two decades following
the approval of the Universal Declaration, one might be tempted to
agree with wary politicians and critics of international law that it is
impossible to reach a consensus as to international control of Human
Rights. Nothing could be farther from the truth. There have been two
specific areas of achievement which can be used as encouraging evi-
dence of the feasibility of the project.
A first important step has been the conclusion in the past twenty
years of twenty-one international conventions in specific areas of Hu-
man Rights, under the sponsorship of the United Nations, the ILO and
17. There was extensive debate in the Third Committee on the final draft of the
Protocol as to the merits of the right of individual petition. The representative of the
Soviet Union emphasized his position that "the right of individual petition was wrong
in principle because it would subvert the rule of contemporary law that only subjects of
international law were States." U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1439, at 11 (1966). See also U.N.
Doe. A/C.3/SR.1418, at 4 (1966).
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UNESCO. 8 The device of breaking down the overwhelming question of
protection of all fundamental freedoms into a flexible sequence of nar-
row and well defined issues has revealed that, where the commitment
was more limited, the consensus of nations could be more readily se-
cured.' 9 This device was used successfully in formulating the Conven-
tions on Abolition of Slavery and Forced Labor, on Genocide, on Refu-
gees, on Stateless Persons, on Discrimination in Education, on Political
Rights of Women, on Consent to Marriage and on Discrimination in
Employment, all of which are now in force in a large number of na-
tions.
Another even more effective achievement in the international pro-
tection of fundamental freedoms is the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights20 which has been in force for fifteen years and, today, is
binding in sixteen European States. This includes all of the members of
the Council of Europe except France and Switzerland. Under the terms
of the Convention, member States not only assumed a formal interna-
tional obligation to recognize and protect at the domestic level the indi-
vidual rights defined in the text, as to citizens, stateless and aliens, but
they also submitted to a system of international control as to their
compliance through the creation of the European Commission of Hu-
man Rights and submission to the Committee of Ministers. In addition,
eleven States2' have also accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the
European Court of Human Rights created by the Convention to ad-
judicate any alleged violation of fundamental freedoms, and the juris-
diction of the Commission to receive, hear and pass upon petitions filed
by individuals alleging violations of their fundamental rights by one of
the eleven States.
18. U.N. Press Release, Ref. Paper No. 6, June 1967.
19. del Russo, Dimensions and Relevance of Human Rights Under the Rule of Law,
Washington World Peace Through Law Conference (1965).
20. For a complete current bibliography on the EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS [hereinafter referred to as the CONVENTION] see the
YEARBOOK OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS [hereinafter cited as YEAR-
BOOK], vols. 1-8 Nijhoff, The Hague (1955-1965).
The Convention was signed in Rome on November 4, 1950, by all of the Member
States of the Council of Europe; it came into force on September 3, 1953, upon rati-
fication by the tenth State, Luxembourg. I YEARBOOK 96, 102 (1955). It is now binding
upon sixteen countries: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, The German Federal
Republic, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, The Netherlands, Norway,
Sweden, Turkey and the United Kingdom.
21. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland, Ireland,
Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Council
of Europe B(67)47, July 31, 1967.
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The Commission exercises conciliatory and adjudicating functions,22
holds hearings and receives evidence, including the statement and wit-
nesses of the petitioner. The petitioner has right to counsel of his choice
or, if needed, is assigned counsel at the expense of the Council of Eur-
ope. The fact that the Commission may refer to the Court individual
applications found admissible and meritorious, confirms the extraor-
dinary precedent established by this system in international law. For
the first time it has been possible for an individual, regardless of national-
ity, to summon before an international judicial body a sovereign State
for a breach of international law and to obtain a remedy for such breach.
It is extremely significant that as of December 1967 over 3,300 individ-
ual petitions have been filed with the European Commission by individ-
uals of thirty-six different nationalities and by stateless persons. The
seven cases2 referred to the European Court of Human Rights have all
been cases of individual petition.
It is true that, at first blush, the Court appears to be an international
tribunal in the traditional sense: Article 44 of the Convention defining
the parties entitled to bring a case before the Court makes no reference
to individual petitioners who are vicariously represented in the Court
proceedings by the Commission as public defender of Human Rights.
After further analysis, however, it appears that the Court has granted
special consideration to the individual petitioner. First, in drafting its
rules of procedure it stipulated that it may hear as a witness or expert or
in any other capacity "any person whose statements may appear to be
useful to the fulfillment of its function." 24 In addition, in its first two
decisions the Court revealed at once its particular concern to protect
fully the interests of the individual petitioner. In the case of Lawless
v. Ireland,25 the Commission, in its memorial filed with the Court on June
27, 1960, had requested leave to insert in the file of the proceedings
the written observations submitted by the petitioner on the Commission's
report at the conclusion of its hearings. The Irish Government in its
counter-memorial attacked the validity of the request as "an attempt to
introduce into the proceedings in this Court the individual with at
22. See CONVENTION arts. 25-29.
23. Lawless v. Ireland, 4 YEARBOOK 430 (1961); DeBecker v. Belgium, 5 YEARBOOK
320 (1962); and five cases now pending before the Court: The Belgian Linguistic Cases,
1474/62, 1677/62, 1691/62, 1769/63, 1994/63 and 2126/64; Wemhoff v. Federal Republic
of Germany, 2122/64; Neumeister v. Austria, 1936/63, Stogmiller v. Austria, 1602/62,
Matznetter v. Austria 2178/64, 7 YEARBOOK 330 (1966).
24. EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, rule 38(1).
25. Cases cited note 23 supra.
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least some of the attributes of a party," 26 although it granted that if it
should think fit, the Court certainly would have the power to call an
individual applicant as a witness. The Court in its preliminary judgment
found that the Commission was entitled to make known the applicant's
views to the Court and stated in language of historic moment:
An applicant, although he is not entitled to bring the case before
the Court... is nevertheless directly concerned in the proceedings
before the Court; . . . it must be borne in mind that the applicant
instituted the proceedings before the Commission and .. .would
be directly affected by any decision on the substance of the case.
The Court must bear in mind its duty to safeguard the interests of
the individual who may not be a Party to any Court proceedings;
... accordingly it is in the interest of the proper administration of
justice that the Court should have knowledge of and, if need be,
take into consideration the applicant's point of view .. .and the
Court may also hear the applicant in accordance with Rule 38 of
the Rules of Court.. 27
The inferences of this language are clear and stringent not only as to
the peculiar nature of a Human Rights proceeding but also as to the
real role of the individual before the Court.
A specific study of the jurisprudence of the Court, the Commission'
and of the two hundred decisions of domestic courts of member States
applying and interpreting the Convention would fully reveal the effec-
tiveness of this protection of fundamental freedoms vis-a-vis the State.
We have to limit ourselves here to the highlights. As a result of the
second case which came before the Court, De Becker v. Belgium,2 9
the Belgian Parliament in 1961 amended the legislation which had been
successfully challenged by petitioner before the Commission and thus
afforded De Becker the relief requested in his application.
In 1962 the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure was amended 30 to
provide equal representation to prosecution and defense at the appellate
level, as a result of the filing with the Commission of a large number of
individual petitions by prison inmates who alleged a violation of Article
26. The Lawless Case, Series B EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 277 (1960 61).
27. Id. at 278.
28. See YEARBOOKS and COLLECTED DECISIONS OF THE COMMISSION vols. 1-22.
29. 5 YEARooK 320 (1962).
30. Act of July 18, 1962, B.G.B.L. Bundesgesetzblatt, No. 229, 5 YEARBOOK 344 (1962).
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6 of the Convention. By subsequent Austrian legislation, 3' the appli-
cants whose cases were found admissible by the Commission were en-
titled to a rehearing within six months after the law came into force.
In other instances, through the good offices of the Commission, the
petitioner obtained redress from the respondent State either in monetary
compensation for miscarriage of justice as in the case of Boecknan v.
Belgiuwn,'2 or by conditional release and probation through a measure
of pardon as in the case of Porschke v. Germany'3 which involved un-
lawful length of detention.
The international control on State compliance with the individual
protection of fundamental freedoms operates also as an effective deter-
rent at the domestic level. The statistics of the Council of Europe as of
December 196534 make reference to over 165 State Court decisions
interpreting and applying provisions of the Convention. Under the lan-
guage of Article 1, the member States have in fact recognized ipso facto
to everyone in their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in
the Convention. The English text "shall secure" finds corroboration in
the French "reconnaissent" 35 which conveys the self-executing im-
mediacy of the present tense. The intent of the drafters that Article 1
be self-executing and directly enforceable by individuals in the national
courts is confirmed by the preparatory works and debates where it
transpired that the present language was the result of a specific amend-
ment.30 Mr. Rolin, author of the amendment, after the Convention came
into force stated on the floor of the Consultative Assembly:
According to Article 1 ... the States did not "agree to recog-
nize" in their legislation, they "recognized:" there is all the differ-
ence. After this Convention is approved by our Parliaments and
ratified, there follows that without the passing of further legisla-
31. Act of March 27, 1963, B.G.B.L. No. 66 (1963).
32. Appl. 1727/62, 6 Y.aRooK 371.
33. 21 CoLLEcr. DECIsIoNs OF THE Co,1MissioN 84 (March, 1967).
34. Council of Europe Releases H(65)7, H(66) 10, H(67)2 of 1965-67.
35. See del Russo, The European Bill of Rights, 4 SANTA CLARA LAWYER 8, 12, n.16
(1963). On the self-executing nature of -Art. 1, see Siisterhenn, L'application de la Con-
vention sur le plan du droit interne, LA PROTECTION INTERNATiONALE DES DRorrs DE
L'Hom DANs LE CADRE ETJROPE . 303, 305 (1961); Comte, The Application of the
European Convention on Hwnan Rights in Municipal Law, 4 JouRNAL OF THE ITErR-
NATIONAL COMMIssION OF JuRIsrs 94 (1962); Buergenthal, The Domestic Status of the
European Convention on Hunan Rights, 13 BurrAx~o L. REv. 354 (1964).
36. CONSuLTATwE ASSEMaBLY REPORTS 2d Sess. 915 (1950).
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tion our Courts are fully empowered to enforce the provisions
of the ConventionY7
In its decision on admissibility of the petition in Austria v. Italy in
1961, the European Human Rights Commission stated:
It follows that the obligations undertaken by the High Con-
tracting Parties in the Convention are essentially of an objective
character being designed rather to protect the fundamental rights
of individual human beings from infringement by any of the ...
Parties than to create subjective and reciprocal rights for the
High Contracting Parties themselves.ss
The jurisprudence of the national courts has corroborated this prin-
ciple. In November 1966 the Brussels Court of First Instance in a case
of language discrimination found a Belgian law incompatible with
Articles 10 and 14 of the Convention and stated in part:
• . . The Convention seeks in principle to safeguard the rights
of any individual acting in a private capacity ... the said Conven-
tion having established rights of a higher order which individuals
are entitled to invoke and exercise...
It must be allowed that the international convention confers
subjective rights on the nationals of the contracting states and
guarantees their exercise, therein overriding and disregarding any
other conflicting rules established even subsequently by national
legislation.39
The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany in December 19650
held that deprivation of personal liberty in the case of an individual
suspected of a crime could be permitted only in exceptional cases. Ordi-
narily, the principle of presumption of innocence would forbid it. Such
a principle is not expressly set forth in the German Basic Law, but has
been generally accepted as a corollary to the rule of law and has been
introduced into the positive law of the Federal Republic of Germany
through Article 6(2) of the Human Rights Convention. The German
Supreme Court, the Federal Court of Justice, in three separate cases
37. Id. 5th Sess. 341 (1953).
38. App1. No. 788/60, 4 YEARBOOK 116 (1961).
39. Council of Europe Release H(67) 4 at 74-75 quoting from REvuE DE DRorr
PENAL ET DE CRIMINOLOGIE at 89 (1966).
40. Id. at 27.
[Vol. 9:749
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS
on unlawful detention dealing with Article 5(5) of the Convention
as a basis for an individual right of compensation for violation of funda-
mental rights, stated in 1960 that the Convention "deliberately confers
in many of its provisions directly enforceable rights on individuals." 41
In a speech in the Dutch Parliament in support of the adoption of the
optional clause conferring jurisdiction on the Commission to receive
individual petitions, the statement was made by Mr. Van Rijckevorsel
that:
.. I regard the recognition of a right of individual petition as a
welcome extension of the Convention on Human Rights as we ap-
proved it in 1954. I welcome it because it establishes beyond doubt
that international law is concerned also with individuals ... The
Convention lays down individual rights. So that individuals become
the subject of international law in opposition to the most common-
ly held theory that international law concerns States and relations
between States alone.42
HUMAN RIGHTS AND DOMESTIC JURISDICTION
Fifteen years of testing of the international law of Human Rights in
the proving ground of the operations and institutions of the European
Convention should bear evidence that the only hope of effectiveness in
the international control of Human Rights is to be found outside the
political sphere of international relations, in the objective order of legal
proceedings established by conventional law.
One of the first reactions in United Nations debates to the provisions
of the 1948 Draft Covenant on Human Rights was an attitude of stern
rejection as against "intervention in the internal affairs of a State . . .
undermining the sovereignty and independence of particular States." 4
The first debates on the treatment of Indians in South Africa" and
the later ones on apartheid,45 brought out intermittently the defense
that the issue was one of exclusive domestic jurisdiction as it related to
the treatment of nationals by their own State. The same objection was
raised in the Security Council in 19564" as to the Soviet intervention
41. Id. at 17, 33 and 44.
42. 3 YEARwoOn 584 (1960).
43. Statement by the Soviet Delegate, U.N. Doc. E/CN4/154 (1948).
44. See Report of the Commission on Racial Situation in South Africa, 8 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. 16 at 22, U.N. Doc. A/2505 (1953).
45. U.N. Docs. A/C.4/SR.76 and A/2475 sec. 14.
46. 9 U.N. SCOR, 754th meeting. Supp. Nov. 14, 1956 at 125; 9 U.N. GAOR (Emer.
Sess. II) at 2.
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in Hungary and the repression of fundamental freedoms of the Hun-
garian people. This defense was also raised in a number of other in-
stances.47
This approach to the establishing of a conventional law of Human
Rights would undoubtedly prove to be a fatal error, mainly for two
reasons. First, it is the consensus of States that the issues of fundamental
freedoms and of peace are so closely interwoven that the preservation of
our civilization rests on their recognition and protection. In addition,
the power and competence of international law in the subject of Human
Rights is no longer open to question after half-a-century of agreements
concluded by States on protection of minorities, on outlawing of slavery,
on treatment of war prisoners and civilian population, on genocide, on
freedom of education, marriage and employment, and other areas which
are fit and proper subjects for conventional international law. With all
their delays, weaknesses and faults, we must admit that international
organizations have explored and defined a number of specific areas of
Human Rights and, in the last two decades, concluded a number of con-
ventions which are now in force. Today, it is therefore not only unreal-
istic, but tragic, for any lawyer who has the interest and image of his
own country at heart, to recommend withdrawal from participation in
any world community's effort to establish international control on Hu-
man Rights obligations of States, on the ground that the treatment of
citizens by a State is solely a subject for domestic jurisdiction.
Human Rights treaties by their very nature are substantially different
from any other form of conventional international law as States therein
do not protect and further their interests, do not seek to establish their
rights, but only undertake duties for the benefit of the individual human
being. There is no quid pro quo to be evaluated, only compliance to be
measured and accepted. In the language of the International Court of
Justice in its advisory opinion on reservations to the Genocide Conven-
tion:
The Convention was manifestly adopted for a purely humani-
tarian and civilizing purpose ... since its object on the one hand is
to safeguard the very existence of certain human groups and on
the other to confirm and endorse the most elementary principles
47. One of the latest examples is provided by the debates in the Third Committee
on the Optional Protocol to the draft Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. See
statements of representatives of the Soviet Union and of Ethiopia, U.N. Docs. A/C.3/SR.
1439, at 4, 10 (1966).
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of morality. In such a Convention the contracting States do not
have any interests of their own; they merely have one and all, a
common interest, namely, the accomplishment of those high pur-
poses which are the raison d'etre of the Convention. Consequently,
in a convention of this type, one cannot speak of individual advan-
tages or disadvantages to states, or of the maintenance of a perfect
contractual balance between rights and duties.
4s
In his dissenting opinion on the South West Africa Case, Judge
Tanaka discussed at length the question of the international validity of
Human Rights and state obligations in the international sphere cor-
responding to those in the domestic sphere:
The principle of the protection of human rights is derived from
the concept of man as a person and his relationship with society
which cannot be separated from universal human nature. The
existence of human rights does not depend on the will of a State;
neither internally on its law or any other legislative measure, nor
internationally on treaty or custom, in which the express or tacit
will of a State constitutes the essential element.
A State or States are not capable of creating human rights by
law or by convention; they can only confirm their existence and
give them protection. The role of the State is no more than
declaratory....
Human rights have always existed with the human being. They
existed independently of, and before, the State. Alien and even
stateless persons must not be deprived of them.49
Classifying the protection of human rights as belonging in the interna-
tional field to the jus cogens,50 the imperative law, not susceptible of be-
ing changed by agreement, he added:
To sum up, the principle of the protection of human rights has
received recognition as a legal norm under three main sources of
international law, namely (1) international conventions, (2) inter-
national custom and (3) the general principles of law. Now, the
principle of equality before the law or equal protection by the law
presents itself as a kind of human rights norm. Therefore, what
48. Reservations to the Genocide Convention Case, [19511 LCJ. 15.
49. South West Africa Cases [19661, I.CJ. 61 Am. J. IlNT'L L. 116, 159 (1967).
50. See Verdross, Jus Dispositivn and Jus Cogens in International Law, 60 AM. J.
IN-'L L. 55, 58-60 (1966).
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has been said on human rights in general can be applied to the
principle of equality .... 51
State sovereignty need not be shattered by agreement to Human
Rights Conventions as any effective form of international control also
contemplates the necessary protection of States. This is amply cor-
roborated in the operations of the European Convention, where there
are provided rights of derogation of States, 2 certain rights of reserva-
tion, 3 specific limitations to most of the rights in the interest of national
safety and the prerequisite of exhaustion of domestic remedies'- for ad-
missibility of a petition before the European Commission." Further, the
non self-executory nature of certain provisions implies State action prior
to the enforceability of the treaty in the domestic order as national law.
This protective bulwark has emerged with regard to compliance by
the United States with the fundamental international obligation under
the United Nations Charter to conform our own legal order to the
principles and provisions of any agreement to which we would be a
party. In his concurring opinion in Oyama v. California, Justice Black
stated in 1947:
We have recently pledged ourselves to co-operate with the
United Nations to "promote... universal respect for and observ-
ance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language or religion." How can this
nation be faithful to this international pledge if State laws which
bar land ownership by aliens on account of race are permitted to
be enforced?"
Even stronger was the language of Justice Murphy's concurrence:
The Alien Land Law stands as a barrier to the fulfillment of that
national pledge. Its inconsistency with the Charter, which has
been duly ratified and adopted by the United States is but one
more reason why the Statute must be condemnedY7
51. See supra note 49 at 161.
52. EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS art. 15.
53. Id. art. 64.
54. Id. arts. 2,4,6,8,9 and 11.
55. Id. art. 26.
56. 332 U.S. 633, 649-50 (1947).
57. Id. at 673.
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But a few years later the same provision of Article 55 of the Char-
ter, found to be the supreme law of the land by the California
Court of Appeals, 5s was defined by the Supreme Court of that state
as "non self-executing" on the following grounds:
The provisions of the Charter pledging cooperation in pro-
moting observance of fundamental freedoms lack the mandatory
quality and definiteness, which would indicate an intent to create
justifiable rights in private persons immediately upon ratification.
Instead they are framed as a promise of future action by the mem-
ber nations.a9
Another extremely important procedural protection of State sover-
.eignty in case of individual petitions has been provided in the structure
and operation of the European Convention. It was a matter of deep
concern to all States during debates at the Consultative Assembly and in
Committee hearings on the drafting of the Convention, that the right of
individual petition to the Commission, if granted, might lend itself
to abuse for political propaganda or that persons affected by psycho-
pathic complexes or with totally unfounded claims may involve a State
in proceedings amounting to embarrassment or indignities.
The first task entrusted to the Commission under Articles 26-27 of
the Convention and Article 45 of its Rules is to screen admissibility
of individual petitions in a preliminary examination by a three-member
Sub-Commission, without any notice to the State concerned. Only after a
prima facie evidence of admissibility of the petition has been established,
notice of the pending application is served upon the defendant State
and its submissions solicited as to the preliminary question of admissi-
bility of the petition. A judicial hearing is then held by the Commis-
son, written and oral testimony is taken and a final decision is issued
on the question of admissibility of the case. After the application is
accepted a seven-member Sub-Commission is set up to hear the merits
of the case and a hearing is conducted to determine whether or not
58. Fuji v. State of California, 217 P.2d 481 (Cal. App. Ct. 1950). But see Wright,
National Courts and Human Rights: The Fuji Case, 45 Ar. J. INT'L L. 62 (1951).
59. 242 P.2d 617 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1952). See also Camacho v. Rogers, 199 F. Supp. 155
(SD. N.Y. 1961), Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, 60 NW 2d 110 (Iowa
Sup. Ct. 1953). But see as to Art. 104 of the Charter Balfour, Guthrie and Co. v.
United States, 90 F. Supp. 831, 832 (ND. Cal. 1950) "As a treaty ratified by the
United States the Charter is part of the supreme law of the land . . . No imple-
mental legislation would appear to be necessary to endow the United Nations with
legal capacity in the United States."
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there has been a breach of the Convention. Very few petitions reach
the third stage; the majority are found inadmissible and rejected at
the first stage, even before the summoning of the State. 0 The experience
of the European Convention and its jurisprudence reveal the advantages
of such screening procedure and will be of great help in the setting
up of operations of Regional Human Rights Conventions in other
continents.
In 1967 three Human Rights Conventions were pending before the
Senate of the United States for advice and consent to ratification: the
Supplementary Convention on Slavery, in force since 1957 and to which
sixty-nine States are parties; the Convention on the Abolition of Forced
Labor, ratified by seventy-eight States and in force since 1959; and
the Convention on Political Rights of Women, ratified by fifty-three
States and in force since 1954. In forwarding the three Conventions to
the Senate on July 22, 1963, President Kennedy had stated:
United States law is, of course, already in conformity with these
Conventions, and ratification would not require any change in our
domestic legislation. However, the fact that our Constitution al-
ready assures us of these rights does not entitle us to stand aloof
from documents which project our heritage on an international
scale. The day-to-day unfolding of events makes it even clearer
that our welfare is interrelated with the rights and freedoms as-
sured the peoples of other nations.
These Conventions deal with human rights which may not yet be
secure in other countries .... There is no society so advanced that
it no longer needs periodic recommitment to human rights.
The United States cannot afford to renounce responsibility for
support of the very fundamentals which distinguish our concepts
of government from all forms of tyranny...
Attorney General Ramsey Clark, speaking before the American Bar
Association House of Delegates on August 9, 1967, supported a motion
for adherence to the three Conventions . 2 However, the Chairman of the
American Bar Association Standing Committee on Peace and Law
60. As of May 1, 1967 out of 3,128 applications filed since 1955 with the Commission
2,322 had been rejected de plano at the preliminary stage and 82 after communication
to the Respondent Government. See COUNCIL OF EURoPE RELFASE B(67)47 of July 31,
1967 at 19.
61. 49 Department of State Bulletin 322 (1963).
62. 2 INT'L LAWYER 18 (1967).
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Through the United Nations, Mr. Eberhard Deutsch, presented the
adverse report of his Committee on all three treaties and vigorously
urged adoption of the Committee's recommendation to oppose rati-
fication by the United States of those treaties as "international covenants
on Human Rights having no direct relationship to the external affairs,
and lying essentially within the domestic jurisdiction, of the United
States." 63 In its lengthy report, Mr. Deutsch's Committee had stated
in part:
It is the view of the Committee that international relations have
not yet reached the stage at which the United States should sur-
render its exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of its own in-
ternal order and the relations between its own national and local
governments and their citizens. It is submitted that the cause of
Human Rights neither justifies nor requires participation in treaties
which would prejudice the domestic jurisdiction of the United
States and the federal/state structure."
The main thrust of the argument opposing ratification was that the
Conventions deal primarily with matters of internal rather than interna-
tional concern and as the separate statement of four Committee mem-
bers reveals:
In the United States... in many instances a treaty, once rati-
fied, becomes the "supreme law of the land." So, as this country is
concerned... it is appropriate to consider whether the benefits of
having Human Rights law formulated by international organiza-
tions outweigh the principle that a citizen is entitled to expect that
the law governing the domestic relations between himself and- his
own government is formulated, debated, and enacted by repre-
sentatives chosen by himself and his fellow citizens in accordance
with the constitutional processes of his own society.,
After extended debate a substitute resolution, submitted by the Section
of International Comparative Law of the American Bar Association
under the chairmanship of Edward D. Re, was adopted by the House
of Delegates by a vote of 115 to 96 favoring accession to the Slavery
Convention and recommending no action and opposition, respectively,
63. 1 INT'L LAWYER 625.
64. Id. at 616.
65. Statement by Messrs. Folsom, Haight, Maxwell and Ray, Id. at 650, 659.
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on the Forced Labor Convention and on the Convention on Political
Rights of Women. In accordance with the American Bar Association
Resolution submitted, and testimony given in September 1967 to the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the Senate transmitted to the
Chief Executive its advice on ratification of the Slavery Convention
only and tabled consideration of the other treaties. On December 6, 1967
the United States' ratification was deposited on the first United Nations
Human Rights Convention ever ratified by the United States. Thus,
of the original fifty-one United Nations members, only Spain and South
Africa have failed to ratify any of the Human Rights Conventions.6"
The position taken by our American Bar Association in this matter
has been a source of grave concern to many lawyers in this country
and abroad. It is possible to visualize that there may still be differences
of opinion as to the wisdom of creating supranational institutions with
power to settle economic and political problems over which national
States alone should be arbiters in the protection of national interests.
But, today, in the field of Human Rights it is beyond dispute that re-
spect for the individual, his dignity and his fundamental freedoms is
well above the collective interest of any State. Given the world of
reality, one must admit that the reason of State is a temptation lurking
behind the power of any government, even in a democracy; thus, effec-
tive protection for those fundamental freedoms can only be secured
by the control of international institutions.
The argument often advanced in our country is that our democratic
system of government under law already furnishes more freedom and
more opportunity to all individual citizens, more protection and re-
spect of the rights of man than any other people in the world enjoys;
and that our Supreme Court is the guardian of our great constitutional
principles as a living force protecting liberties. Hence, because we our-
selves have nothing to gain for our own system, we should not submit
ourselves to any international control on Human Rights. The great
Judge John Parker gave his answer to such argument a decade ago:
It is not enough for the defense of freedom, that we preserve it
in this country. Liberty is endangered throughout the world and
we cannot preserve it here without securing its foundations on a
worldwide basis. ... Whether we like it or not, the leadership of
the free world has devolved upon us; and the future of our own
66. Gardner, The Three Hwman Rights Treaties: Good Law and Good Policy, 1
INT'L LAWYER 633, 635.
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liberties as well as the liberties of free men elsewhere depends
upon how we exercise that leadership.67
Other democratic countries have gone through similar pangs of doubts
and rejection in the area of Human Rights. The United Kingdom was
the first member of the Council of Europe which ratified, in March
1951, the European Convention, but it was not until January 1966 that
it recognized the compulsory jurisdiction of the European Court of
Human Rights and the right of individual petition before the European
Commission. Time and time again during those ten years while a Brit-
ish jurist, Lord McNair, presided over the European Court, the question
was raised in the British Parliament as to the delay in filing the declara-
tions of acceptance. The Government's position would consistently
be stated as taking the view
- that States are the proper subject of international law and if
individuals are given rights under international treaties, effect
should be given those rights through the national law of the States
concerned.68 The reason why we do not accept the idea of com-
pulsory jurisdiction of a European Court is because it would mean
that British Codes of common and statute law would be subject
to review by an international court.69
Today, however, the United Kingdom has modified its views without
suffering any earthshaking experiences; and this is a much greater step
than the one involved in the mere ratification of the three Human Rights
Conventions by the United States.
Any international lawyer deeply committed to Human Rights has
felt distressed in discovering among the leaders of the legal profession
in the United States such astounding limited vision of the pressing
urgency for effective international protection of fundamental freedoms.
The lesson of history has passed them by. On the other hand the threat
of totalitarianism has taught the European nations the need for unity
and mutual assistance to avoid a new Nazi tragedy. Very appropriately,
67. Parker, Our Great Responsibilities: We Must Lead the World to Freedom and
Justice, 44 ABAJ 17, 20 (1958).
68. The ratification of the Convention had already brought upon Great Britain the
international obligation to conform its laws to the treaty, but the individual cases would
be tried under national laws and procedures.
69. House of Commons Weekly Hansard, No. 438 Nov. 26, 1958, col. 333. See also Id.
No. 462, June 25, 1959 col. 1546-1556.
1968]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
a distinguished British jurist, the director of Human Rights at the
Council of Europe, quotes Mr. Spaak's remark that the man who did
most to bring about the union of Western Europe was Josef Stalin."
Thus the first legal instrument to emerge from the deliberations of the
Council of Europe was the cornerstone of the union, the European
Convention of Human Rights, which in Robert Schuman's words, "pro-
vides foundations on which we can base the defense of the human
personality against all tyrannies and against all forms of totalitarian-
ism." -Fifteen years of successful operations of that Convention, which
bears the stamp of universality, have proved to the world that the
recognition of the individual in international law may be achieved
under the rule of law without undermining the sovereignty and inde-
pendence of the States parties to the treaty. Thus while the institutions
of the Convention have been writing the first international case law of
Human Rights, the pattern of effective international control has found
many followers among nations in other continents seeking solutions to
common issues of Human Rights, whether in Africa, in the Americas
or in Southeast Asia.72
If a total commitment to Human Rights by all nations of the world
is presently utopian, and the ideological cleavage is too great to permit
agreement, the successful implementation of the European Convention
most certainly shows that a regional approach to the international pro-
tection of Human Rights is the immediate answer to the problem.
States closely connected geographically, culturally, historically and
traditionally, share common political and social problems and are in-
clined to join more promptly in a system of mutual obligations and
control for Human Rights protection within their boundaries. The
Inter-American Convention of Human Rights, now in the last drafting
stage, provides for the right of individual petition and for the creation
70. Robertson, The Political Background and Historical Development of the European
Convention on Human Rights; THE INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTER.Y
26 (Supp. 11, 1965).
71. Id.
72. The Constitutions of Sierra Leone, Uganda and with some modifications those
of Kenya, Malawi and Zambia have incorporated the principles and language of the
European Convention. As to the Nigerian Constitution, see Amachree, Fundamental
Rights in Nigeria, 11 How. L.J. 463, 479 (1965). See statements at first Congress of
African Jurists in Lagos, Nigeria, The Law of Lagos, INTERNA ONAL CoMmIssIoN OF
JuiRsrs 9 (1961). See also Sandifer, Human Rights in the Inter-American System, 11
How. L.J. 508 (1966) and Declaration of Bangkok, Thailand, in Dynamic Aspects of
the Rule of Law in the Modern Age, INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JtUss 175, 191
(1965).
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of a Court of Human Rights. The Inter-American Commission has been
in existence since 1959 with jurisdiction extended in 1965 to include
receiving and investigating individual complaints of violation of certain
fundamental rights by OAS States. Since 1967 it has been recognized
as one of the official organs of the Organization of American States.
In this International Year of Human Rights it is hoped that thoughtful
people everywhere will direct their attention to the problem of interna-
tional protection of fundamental freedoms and explore it in all of its
aspects. Clearly the task of an enlightened Bar and of the law schools
and universities is to provide leadership to and awareness to public opin-
ion in all countries of the world on the individual and collective interest
in establishing a system of international control on State compliance with
their Human Rights obligations. Then governments will be easily per-
suaded and encouraged to an escalation of efforts toward a world order
of peace and justice under law.
